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»Rien n'est possible sans les hommes,
 rien n'est durable sans les institutions.« (Jean Monnet)
Introduction
The Convention, despite the progress on many important issues, faced
unprecedented divisions over some of the most fundamental questions of
power balance in the EU of twenty-five or more members.  The diverging
stances have been presented as a clash between the smaller and larger
member states of the Union. As we cannot naturally assume that the
positions taken by smaller countries are the same on all the issues and
neither are those of the big ones, for the ones where there seems to be
major disagreements –i.e. the institutional questions - this rule largely
applies.
Looking at the arithmetic, in May 2004 there will be only six large member
states (Poland included) out of twenty-five, who will, however, account for
roughly three quarters of the Union’s population. This is an entirely
different situation from the original European Communities for which the
institutions were designed. Although the respective major institutional
players underwent some changes in the period, no major reshuffling of
power took place. Since then the number of small countries increased and
even more so will it be after ten new countries join in May next year.  That
is why the attempts are being made to redesign the institutions to suit a
different Europe that we know from until recently.
The issue was recently exacerbated in the politics of the Convention. On
one hand, the Presidium and its chairman Giscard d´Estaing has been
consistently refusing to incorporate the proposals of the small countries or
come up with a compromise solution. The Convention boss even
acknowledged to some European media1 that one should not naturally
assume that the states are equal. This caused an allergic reaction and
counter-proposals of a vast majority of smaller countries in the
                                                          
1 “Citizens are equal – but some states more equal than others”. Article by Dana Spinant in European Voice, 22-
28 May 2003.
2Convention. The compromise of the Convention will be presented by Mr
Giscard to the European Council in Thessaloniki 20 May 2003. Even if the
Convention in the end managed to come up with one single proposal there
are still room for bargaining in the upcoming IGC. There is a risk that the
ambition of the Convention is going to be watered down and the EU is
going to end up in a similar institutional muddle as after Nice.
This paper tries to explore the stances taken by small countries of the
Union on two issues that seem to be overwhelmingly fundamental to them
– the question of the Council presidency and the question of the size,
composition and legitimacy of the Commission.
Council presidency reform – who will hold the Sceptre?
The Council reform seems to be one of the main issues addressed by the
Convention where the cleavage between the smaller and larger EU
member states (both current and candidates) clearly emerges.2 While
those advocating the current proposals in the draft Constitution creating
the post of a permanent European Council Chair (Britain, France, Italy,
Spain, Germany, Poland, Sweden and Denmark) argue with the need to
increase the efficiency of the Council, the opponents emphasise the
necessity of sticking to equality between members. On the other hand, all
the states feel the need for a Council reform of some kind, as it is one of
the most unstable and vulnerable institutions.3 Only if we take into
account its ever-changing composition, the Council – unlike the
Commission or the European Parliament – is not vested with a clear-cut
mandate and makes it dependent on the current political situation in the
individual member states4.
The Council is the EU institution representing most the inter-governmental
element of the Union. The small countries by far do not have the same
views of what role should be taken by this body – some tend to favour
stronger position of the Council (e.g. Estonia). Others like Belgium, the
Netherlands or the Czech Republic are inclined to take more equilibrated
approach, with an equally strong role of the Commission and the
European Parliament. But this is largely given by the current political
representation – it is quite likely that if the opposition was in power in the
Czech Republic, for example, the picture would look completely different
and the country would find itself much along the British and Scandinavian
                                                          
2 Giovanni Grevi and Kirsty Hughes, “What Prospects for Compromise on Institutional Questions in the
Convention Endgame?”. EPIN Comment, European Policy Centre (EPC) and Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS), Brussels, May 2003, http://www.epin.org/pdf/comment_GreviHughes_may03.pdf.
3 Guillaume Durand, The need for Council reform, EPC Working Paper, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 15
October 2001, http://www.theepc.net/europe/strand_one_detail.asp?STR_ID=1&REFID=553&TWSEC=
EPC%20Working%20Papers&TWDOSS.
4 This idea was expressed for example by Gisela Stuart, member of the Convention Presidium, at the Annual
Conference of the European Institute in Sofia in November 2002.
3positions. However, over the questions of the Council presidency a small-
large cleavage pattern is quite obvious.
The first observation we can make clearly is that an absolute majority of
smaller member states insists on the preservation of the status quo in
terms of the current rotating Presidency system or envisage the
preservation of some sort of rotation at least5. Denmark and Sweden are
the only notable exceptions, which might be explained by the fact that
these countries have a tendency to favour an inter-governmental
approach. The idea put forward in several other proposals, and most
recently by the Convention Presidium in the draft Articles of the
Constitution, envisages a different system of a permanent president/chair
of the European Council for the period of two and half years, renewable
once. Let us now explore what are the main concerns of the smaller
countries here.
Internal EU agenda setting
The smaller member states view the rotating presidency as one of the
main pre-conditions for keeping the balance between the big and the
small. The presidency is one of the occasions where the smaller member
states can clearly grasp the EU agenda and manage it. It also gives them
an opportunity to give an additional impetus to the development in the
EU. The fact that the country is seen once in a time as the one running
the EU, even though for a limited period, is important in the eyes of its
own citizens.6 Especially if the presidency is generally considered to be a
successful one it helps to an overall increase of popularity of the EU in a
particular country. This point should not be underestimated particularly in
relation to the smaller newcomers as it can play an important role in
increased visibility of such a country in the European polity as well as in
more identification with the Union among the citizens.
On the other hand, the role of the presidency must not be overestimated
either. Nowadays, the presiding country can add some of its priorities to
the overall EU agenda but to a large extent this is a self-driven process7.
It also inherently brings some dangers when a country comes up with an
ambitious plan but its successors in the presidential capacity are not able
to push on its pursuit so much. To take just two recent examples: the
Finnish presidency that came up with the Tampere Scoreboard in Justice
and Home Affairs or the Portuguese presidency that invented the Lisbon
agenda. The outcomes of these ambitious plans so far have been quite
                                                          
5 See for example the Czech government non-paper on the institutional reform, available at www.mzv.cz/
missionEU/convention.
6 See the Speech by Slovenian Foreign Minister, Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, at the Conference “After Copenhagen – the
Larger and Closer Union”, Copenhagen, 24 March 2003, www.gov.si/mzz/govori/03032401.html.
7 Kirsty Hughes, “Franco-German Plans for a Dual Presidency – a Short Comment”, EPIN Comment, CEPS,
Brussels, 16 January 2003, http://www.epin.org/pdf/comment_hughes_jan03.pdf.
4limited. One of the reasons is that countries switching each half a year in
EU leadership do not have enough courage and ambition to push on the
pursuit of these long-term goals but rather carry on by necessity. There is
simply not enough time to negotiate any substantial shifts forward. This
could pose a potential problem for the overall dynamics of the EU
integration process.
The role of the presidency can be crucial as that of the broker and deal
facilitator between particular groups of countries within the EU on various
issues. However, as the experience has shown many times, it is not
always the case. Let us take a recent example of the Danish presidency.
There is no doubt that for the Danes, finishing the enlargement
negotiations with ten candidate countries was number one on the agenda.
However, the role, which the Presidency played in making the final deal,
was not crucial. It is doubtful whether it would be possible to reach a deal
in Copenhagen without prior Franco-German agreement made in Brussels
in October which was the real driving force behind.
Another fact that speaks against the 6-month rotating presidency comes
with the implications of the enlargement. If the current system is to be
maintained, it would mean that each country would hold the presidency
once in every 13 years. Given the limited time scope, no one can really
hope that a country would be able to influence the EU development in any
substantive way. Also the symbolism becomes less important here as the
country will be just one of many running the EU. Another argument
against keeping the rotating presidency is the fact the politicians and the
civil servants working during one presidency will be replaced more often
than every 13 years. The institutional memory of the Council would then
be shorter than the time-span of the rotating system after enlargement.
Why are then the smaller states so anxious about keeping the current
system if most of the arguments speak against it? There are several
explanations. The first is that the current system works and is highly
predictable, albeit with many reservations. With a system of permanent
chair, no one can really say at the moment what would happen with the
inter-institutional equilibrium. It is almost inevitable that an administrative
apparatus would emerge around the President that could potentially rival
the European Commission who is, as we explain further, thought to be the
best friend of smaller countries. They usually support the Community
method and would therefore like to see even the strategic direction
emerging from the Commission rather than from the Council. This,
however, leads to further questions of democratising, legitimising and
perhaps even politicising the Commission for these tasks and whether the
EU is moving more towards intergovernmental or supranational political
finality. This issue will be treated further on in the paper.
When we are considering the legitimacy of streamlining the strategic
direction the EU wants to have, we have to pose the same question in
5relation to the permanent Council chair. The position could potentially
develop into a highly influential and powerful one. Will the President be
accountable only to his or her pairs in the European Council? It could be
quite worrying as the EU leaders tend to behave very differently at the
summits, often forgetting that they have their governments, parliaments
and voters behind their backs. This lack of accountability is a serious
concern. On the other hand, the point, which is sometimes mentioned –
that the Council chair will only listen to the big ones – does not have to
worry the small ones so much. There will be more small countries than the
big ones, thus more candidates for the Council chair emerging from this
category8. Furthermore, even newly suggested qualified majority voting
(QMV) system would still assure they cannot be outvoted by the “Big Six”
in the bid.
Role in the external relations of the Union
For the EU, the one thing that is often stressed is that the current system
does not provide for enough continuity and efficiency in running the EU
foreign policy and leads to an insufficient visibility of the EU in the world.
That is probably true. The question is whether adopting the position of a
permanent Chair would make the EU foreign policy more visible in the
world as well as more efficient.
The Convention President Valery Giscard d´Estaing has stressed that
recent Iraq crisis and deep divisions of Europe arising thereof proved the
necessity of having a permanent president. Draft Article I-21 para 2 of the
Constitution goes along with this, stipulating that “the President of the
European Council shall at his or her level and in that capacity ensure the
external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common
foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”9. This could be interpreted in at least
two ways. The first one is that the permanent president will, in fact,
create the EU foreign policy. It is highly doubtful to envisage that the EU
heads of state and government will be able to confer this competence on a
single person. The other interpretation is that the President will be, in the
realm of foreign policy, just a spokesperson of the European Council, at
the very best the broker between the heads of state on foreign policy
issues (like in EU internal affairs). This might lead to some doubt as to
what would be the role of the European Foreign Minister, which will be
discussed later in the paper. The proposal put forward by the Presidium in
                                                          
8 Max Kohnstamm and Guillaume Durand, “Common Nonsense – Defusing the Escalating ‘Big versus Small’
Row”, European Policy Centre – The Europe We Need, Brussels, May 2003, http://www.theepc.net/europe/
strand_one_detail.asp?STR_ID=1&REFID=1163&TWSEC=Commentary&TWDOSS. Although it is necessary
to mention here that the eventual draft of the Constitution does not stipulate the condition of the European
Council Chair being former member of the Council, thus potentially limiting the scope of candidates from small
countries.
9 Secretariat of the European Convention, CONV 820/03. Brussels, 20 June 2003, http://register.consilium.eu.
int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00820en03.pdf.
6this respect is weak because it is not coming up with any more precise job
description for the permanent president in the area of foreign policy, apart
from this very broad and inconsistent formulation in the draft Article I-21.
Given the virtual non-existence of the EU common stand on some of the
crucial foreign and security policy issues, it is highly unlikely that the
heads of state and government will manage to appoint a person that will
be able to exercise a sufficient influence over them and speak for the EU
in the international arena. Could such a person be a counterpart to Putin
or Bush? Probably not, at least because he or she would not make the
European foreign policy but would be solely the European Council
spokesperson. Even more importantly, he or she will not enjoy as strong
legitimacy as Putin or Bush have which will make it difficult for him or her
to be put on equal footing with them. The potential competition with the
Commission President who will be – whether we want it or not – vested
with some sort of external representation powers, is also more than
evident.
Most of the smaller countries are in favour of seeing a genuine common
position on many foreign policy issues. This is because for smaller
countries it is easier to reach a common stand in the area of a foreign
policy, as they generally do not have global interests but particular ones.
But even with regard to their particular concerns, hardly ever they have
enough structural power to push them through. Influencing them through
the EU structures can be one of the ways of gaining this structural power.
This can explain why some of the small countries would like to see a
stronger role of the Commission in foreign policy. If not, they can rely at
least on enhancing the issues during their presidency. For sure, creation of
the permanent Council chair would make these efforts of smaller states
much more difficult to achieve.
European Foreign Minister – what relation to the Council president?
It is often stressed that one of the ways to make the foreign policy more
efficient is to create a sort of permanent post for running the EU external
relations that would replace the current “troika” system. Small countries
generally assume that this task could be performed by the double-hatted
European Foreign Minister (EFM), and that is why they supported the
initiative in the Convention. The only problem is still possible
encroachment with the position of the Council president.
The views on the institutional position of a European Foreign Minister,
however, differ. Some countries would prefer to have this position based
solely in the Commission (Finland, Belgium); others would prefer the EFM
to be based in the Council (Estonia). The current proposal in Article I-27
stipulates that the Foreign Minister will be appointed by the Council in
concert with the Commission President, thus creating a double-hatted post
as the Foreign Minister would also be one of the Vice-Presidents of the
7Commission10. It seems that this could be a sensible compromise for
smaller countries majority of whom does not favour shifting the external
representation of the Union completely to the Council. Still, many
questions remain left open in the proposal. For instance, as a member of
the Commission, will the Foreign Minister also have to be approved by the
European Parliament? Some might say not, as he or she will be
representing the Council and the European Parliament does not have
much say in CFSP. On the other hand, he or she will be responsible for
Union’s external action in a much broader sense than the current High
Representative, including the external relations falling within the
Community pillar and thus scrutiny from the European Parliament would
be logical. To what extent will he or she be bound by the collegiality in the
Commission?
With relation to the previous discussion, the post of the European Foreign
Minister would not be entirely equal to heads of state and government,
thus his or her influence on formulating and pronouncing on the European
foreign policy issues will be even more limited than that of the President.
However, the current draft of the Constitution states that he or she should
conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy (Art I-27 para 1)
and chair the Foreign Affairs Council (Art I-23 para 2)11. Especially the
first part of this job description creates further confusion of what would be
the relation between the Foreign Minister and the European Council Chair.
Some efficient division of powers between these two functions could still
be imaginable – while the Foreign Minister will run EU foreign policy on a
day-to-day basis, the European Council President will speak on the head
of state level, i.e. as counterpart to Mr Bush or Mr Putin.
However, one must not forget that the problem lies elsewhere. Neither the
permanent European Council Chair, nor the European Foreign Minister will
make much difference unless the system of decision-making in CFSP is
radically changed to QMV or at least some more efficient form of
constructive abstention. It might bring less confusion for the EU
counterparts on the world stage but will hardly make in itself the EU
foreign policy more efficient or visible in a wider world. But there are not
enough countries that are ready to concede this step at the moment, and
certainly not even all of the small ones.
The other necessary step – and not necessarily an easier one to make -is
to try to identify genuine European foreign policy interest that all the 25
countries can agree on or at least do not have a problem with. Europe
needs to find the lowest common denominator in foreign policy in areas
where it can make difference rather than try to be a global policeman
                                                          
10 Secretariat of the European Convention, CONV 820/03. Brussels, 20 June 2003, http://register.consilium
.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00820en03.pdf.
11 Secretariat of the European Convention, CONV 820/03. Brussels, 20 June 2003, http://register.consilium
.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00820en03.pdf.
8while its foreign policy is still being shaped12. It is sure that such an
interest can be found, most probably in the immediate environment of the
Union. In the draft Constitution there is even a specific title on it (Title
VIII), and thus we can presume it will get a “privileged” treatment. The
first EU- run corps in Bosnia and Macedonia prove this. But besides
Balkans other areas can be considered like the Southern Mediterranean,
the Middle East, Ukraine and Russia.
Thus the permanent EU president is not much of an advantage to smaller
countries neither in foreign policy nor in the internal business. It might
bring slightly more continuity into the external representation, but will not
make much more difference towards driving the EU strategically.
Even those countries that support the permanent president do not have
the same ideas about his job description – while the French might like to
make him a strong body potentially developing to the Union president,
others like the UK or the Scandinavians (Denmark, Sweden) would rather
like to see him as a representative figure13. For the time being, he is likely
just to “chair” European Council sessions.
It is surprising, that the small countries who are so much opposed to it do
not come with any strong and reasonably argued counterproposals as
most governments agree that the current system needs revision. The first
really courageous initiative was tabled by Benelux - yes to the permanent
chair in return for the Commission President chairing the GAC.14 But this
sounds like an attempt to make the sort of trade off that we know of from
Nice. Many more innovative proposals could have been made by smaller
countries opposing the permanent president, ranging from the double
hatting of the Council and Commission presidents to the redesign of
rotating presidency so that it is more effective, strategically thinking and
yet representative of different groups of countries in the Union and
maintaining their equal share on guiding the EU. These proposals have
already appeared but they were not taken up or elaborated on further by
small countries. For instance, the Czech government in one of the early
stages of deliberations adopted the idea of having double-hatted
President, which was then turned to team presidency and then to
maintaining the status quo. Instead of this, the small countries let this
point to be hijacked by the big ones.
Unfortunately, it is too late to do this in the Convention. The only chance
for the small countries is to make a strong push during the IGC. Given the
                                                          
12 See Steven Everts, in New Designs for Europe, Centre for European Reform, London 2002.
13 Anna Michalski, Matthias Hnise, European Convention on the Future of Europe: An Analysis of the Official
Positions of the EU Member States, Future Member States and Candidate States, Clingedael Working Paper,
April 2003. Retrieved from http://www.epin.org/pdf/MichalskiCLINGENDAEL.pdf
14 Memorandum of the Benelux, “A balanced institutional framework for an enlarged, more effective and more
transparent Union”, Brussels, 4 December 2002, http://europa.eu.int/futurum /documents/ press/ oth041202
_en.htm.
9fact that it will be run by a country whose government favours the current
proposal, it will be difficult, at least as much as with the President of the
Convention.
European Commission reform
The size – shall everybody have his man or woman in Brussels?
Within a fragmented and relatively blurred inter-institutional framework
the Commission plays a multiple role (Art. 211, TEC); ranging from
initiating the legislative process to ensuring respect for the Treaty and of
derived legislation; from enacting executive measures to supervising
policy implementation. Moreover, the Commission is essential for ensuring
the overall consistency of policy developments at the European level and
for the conciliation of divergent national and institutional interests.
Effectiveness of the Commission in carrying out its core task largely
depends on constructive relations with the other actors involved, namely
the Council of the EU, the European Parliament (“the Holy Trinity”) and
national administrations.”15
The importance of the debate on the role of the Commission in the future
institutional architecture of the EU from the perspective of small countries
is more than relevant. There are at least two arguments, which speak in
favour of this statement:
- the Nice negotiations resolved the question of the composition of the
Commission only partially. It seemed to be a starting point for
undertaking all other necessary institutional reforms, especially
concerning intergovernmental Council and the European Parliament.
However, during the negotiations the reform of the Commission
remained in the shadow of other Amsterdam left-overs, especially
that of the redistribution of votes in the Council to which all member
and applicant states attached much greater importance.
- with exception of Poland and Romania all candidate countries are
among small states. Thus, not only will the fifth enlargement almost
double the membership of the Union, it will also, above all, increase
the number of so-called small states.
European integration has always included large and small members. The
divergence of interests between them was a reality, which the European
Communities had to take into account at the beginning of the integration
process and is a reality that the EU as well has to take into
                                                          
15 Giovanni Grevi, A strong President for a strong Commission, EPC Working Paper, Brussels, 15 October 2001,
http://www.theepc.net/europe/strand_one_detail.asp?STR_ID=1&REFID=551&TWSEC=EPC%20Working%20
Papers&TWDOSS.
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consideration.16 In order to understand why the composition of the
Commission is so important for the small countries, we should also look
into the circumstances under which it emerged as a very good ally of
smaller member states in the Union.
To prevent the predominance of larger states over smaller ones the
»founding fathers« of the European Coal and Steal Community had to
comply with the demand of small states (Benelux) to create an additional
intergovernmental body next to the supranational High Authority because
of their fear that the latter would protect merely the interest of larger
states. Apart from that, the voting arrangements in the Council were
made in favour of small states in order to comfort them in joining larger
neighbours in the supranational community.
In the framework of the European Economic Community and Euratom,
centrality in the institutional setting had been shifted from the
Commission to the Council. Because of the enforcement of the majority
voting principle in the Council17, smaller states paradoxically realised their
interests to be better pursued through a stronger role of the Commission
and the Community method.18 A step aside was represented by an
intermediate period of Luxembourg compromise19 (since 1966), which
inaugurated again the unanimity voting, in accordance with which all
states, small and large, had the opportunity to veto a decision and were
thus placed on the equal footing. It is also in the context of the
Luxembourg compromise that the larger states were not worried with the
impacts of enlargement, which began to change the relative voting power
in the Council between smaller and larger states in favour of the former,
especially through their possibility to create a blocking minority.
The community method on which the process of integration has been
based since the Rome treaties can be described as suitable for current and
                                                          
16 Max Kohnstamm and Guillaume Durand, “Common Nonsense – Defusing the Escalating ‘Big versus Small’
Row”, European Policy Centre  – The Europe We Need, Brussels, May 2003, http://www.theepc.net/europe/
strand_one_detail.asp?STR_ID=1&REFID=1163&TWSEC=Commentary&TWDOSS.
17 As John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher have stated “The founders of the Communities were convinced
that if a veto is exercised on all issues by each member state, the Community would not work. Unanimity on
every issue was not, therefore, a viable option. The Treaty of Rome, consequently, prescribed what had never
been done before – majority voting in an international organisation.” John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher,
“What sort of European Commission does the European Union need?” European Policy Centre – Challenge
Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/ challenge/topdetail.asp?SEC=
documents&SUBSEC=insight&REFID=679.
18 As Temple Lang and Gallagher have explained  “In the multinational environment, where the confidence of all
parties must be gained and retained, the mediator body should be, and should be seen to be, representative of all
the parties so that the special problems of each party can be taken into account. The Community method
necessitates an independent and fully representative Commission with the sole right to propose legislation to be
adopted by the Council and the Parliament. Only the Community method can ensure that the European Union
remains acceptable in all the Member States”. John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of
European Commission does the European Union need?” European Policy Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels,
14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/ challenge/topdetail.asp?SEC=documents&SUBSEC
=insight&REFID=679.
19 Neil Nugent, The European Commission, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.31.
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future small EU Member States. The importance of this method is most
obvious in relation to the core Commission’s competence as an exclusive
legislative initiator. According to the founding treaties the Commission has
the exclusive task of making legislative proposals in the interest of the
whole Community, that means in the interest of small and large States.20
This task was assigned to the Commission as a necessary compensation
for the enforcement of the majority voting principle in the Council21, which
has naturally often led to the out-voting some states. Furthermore
because of the weighted-voting in the Council the probability of out-voting
smaller states had been greater than that of the larger ones. In order to
ensure that the process of integration would not be hampered by
dissatisfaction of out-voted states, it was necessary to create mechanism
through which interests of all parties would be considered. As Temple
Lang and Gallagher have noted “[…]To make sure that the Commission
would act in the interests of all, the Commission’s independence and its
composition, representing the whole Community, were guaranteed. All
this was, and is, needed to make majority voting acceptable”22. This is the
main reason why, according the Community method, the Commission and
not the European Parliament was given the competence of sole legislative
initiator, as it would be considered more logical from the perspective of
domestic political systems.
To strengthen the role of the Commission means exactly to reinforce the
Community method, which on the one hand filters out the unilateral
pursuit of national interests, and on the other hand - which is equally
important from the standpoint of candidate countries - tends to generate
solidarity-oriented outcomes. The Commission itself has proposed in the
White paper on European Governance23, published in July 2001, some
suggestions how this method could be reinvigorated. To mention just few
proposals: simplification of legislative acts, possibility to withdraw
proposals in the event of inter-state bargaining, strengthening the
executive role, elimination of national committees in the comitology
                                                          
20 John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher have pointed out that “[I]f this system is to work, two rules must be
respected. The first is that the parties may only discuss proposals, which have been made by the mediator and not
discuss competing proposals made by others; the second is that, although the mediator’s proposal may be
adopted by a majority, it may be amended only by the mediator or by a unanimous decision of the parties”. John
Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of European Commission does the European Union need?”
European Policy Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/ challenge/
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21 John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher have concluded that “[T]here is a link between the Commission’s
role as the single proposing body of European Community measures and majority voting”. John Temple Lang
and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of European Commission does the European Union need?” European Policy
Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/ challenge/topdetail .asp?SEC
=documents&SUBSEC=insight&REFID=679.
22 John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of European Commission does the European Union
need?” European Policy Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/
challenge/ topdetail.asp?SEC=documents&SUBSEC=insight&REFID=679.
23 European Governance - A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25 July 2001, http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf.
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procedure. Obviously, all these proposals are aimed at enhancing the
Commissions´role.
Commission is namely aware of the fact that under the qualified majority
voting in the Council it will be more difficult to find an approval of its
legislative initiatives. At the same time it seems to be pressed between
the influence of larger states and the aspirations of the European
Parliament to strengthen its legislative role. Any limitation of
Commission’s legislative competence which the European Parliament is
striving for would lead to the increase of power of the larger states and
would consequently ruin the established inter-institutional balance and
weaken the Community method.24
The other reason why the role of the Commission is so important lies in
the so-called “democratic deficit”. As Temple Lang and Gallagher have
stated “[T]he deficit in transparency and accountability in the EU does not
lie with the Commission, but with the Council. The executive power in the
EU has increased and parliamentary power decreased because
Governments meet behind closed doors and make agreements on both
constitutional matters and on legislation”25. The feedback control
mechanism over the decisions they take in respect to European issues is
quite limited. In many EU countries the Parliaments do not actually care
too much about what their government is negotiating in Brussels (notable
exception being mainly Danish Folketinget). Namely, the ministers are
nominated by their governments and are not chosen by their national
parliaments. Thus, for European issues they are accountable neither to
their national parliaments nor to the European Parliament.
Thus, it is not surprising that small states in the future inter-institutional
architecture advocate a strong Commission, capable of representing
general interest of the Union and above all able to counterbalance the
power of larger states in the Council. From the perspective of the
accession countries the positive experience so far obtained during the
accession process should also not be neglected. The Community method
has facilitated the enlargement and enabled to overcome political factors
and bilateral prerequisites, not directly interconnected with the
enlargement process itself (such as dispute on the property restitution
                                                          
24 “The erosion of the Community method tends to favour the larger Member States, which would gain influence
from the move towards inter-governmentalism. The Commission was created primarily to safeguard the interests
of the Union as a whole and to be thoroughly aware of minority interests so as to justify majority voting. Under
the Treaty it was given a status that was and is unique in international law and practice. This was never explained
in the EC/EU Treaties and the result is that many Europeans do not know why the Community was designed as it
was.” John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of European Commission does the European Union
need?” European Policy Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/
challenge/topdetail.asp?SEC=documents&SUBSEC=insight&REFID=679.
25 John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of European Commission does the European Union
need?” European Policy Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/
challenge/topdetail.asp?SEC=documents&SUBSEC=insight&REFID=679.
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between Slovenia and Italy)26. It is also a model that respects the
sovereignty of newly established states.
Regarding this core competence of the Commission it is thus necessary for
all states to be represented in this organ. The provisions of the Treaty of
Nice for the time being take into account such composition, but provide
for a break when membership finally reaches 27. It concluded that when
the number of Member States reaches 27, the Commission will be reduced
to less than the number of the Member States – namely each member
state will not have its own Commissioner and consequently the
Commission will not be fully representative. The consequences of this shift
could be serious: states not represented by a Commissioner could claim
not to be obliged of fulfil the decisions and this may have detrimental
effects on the pace of further integration. As one expert observer has
noted “at any given time there could be several member states which […]
would not be represented in any sense in the Commission. They could be
unwilling to accept what the Commission has proposed, or, more
seriously, what the Commission may have done within the limits of the
powers which the Commission itself is authorised to exercise“27
There are some alternatives to such position, advocated mainly by the
large states, because they all in some ways ensure the preponderance of
their position. The most advocated solutions are: rotation, which
according to some countries should be limited only to smaller states,
classification of portfolios according to their importance and hierarchy of
Commissioners (on junior and senior) – the latter two options have both
undeclared intention that the most important DGs and posts would remain
in the hands of bigger ones. None of them is satisfactory for small states.
Despite the most obvious arguments of proponents of a position that the
Commission as an independent and impartial body does not need to be
fully representative (one Commissioner per Member State) because it
pursues the Community interest and should not reflect national interests,
the reality shows rather different picture. In reality we should distinguish
between the Commissions as a supranational organ and on the other hand
its more intergovernmental nature in which the Commissioners act as a
link between the Commission and the nation state. Despite the principle of
their independence and impartiality, it is a tacit rule that Commissioners
represent member states in a way that they observe and then mediate
which legislative proposals are politically acceptable and which are not in
respective capitals. At the same time they represent the channel of
communication for the requirements of Commission to the member states.
This makes an indispensable part of the process of preparing legislative
                                                          
26 See Irena Brinar and Marjan Svetličič, “Enlargement of the European Union: the case of Slovenia”, Journal of
European Public Policy: Vol.6, No.5, 1999.
27 John Temple Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, “What sort of European Commission does the European Union
need?” European Policy Centre – Challenge Europe, Brussels, 14 February 2002, http://www.theepc.net/
challenge/topdetail.asp?SEC=documents&SUBSEC=insight&REFID=679.
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drafts. A reasonable argument in favour of equal representation in the
Commission stresses “a need for someone to personify ‘the Union’ in each
member states and to convey a European message in the national media
and in the respective national languages. Although a vision of the
European interest cannot be the result of the addition of national interest,
it is important that the institution possessing the monopoly of legislative
initiative in the vast majority of policy areas is able to take national
specifics and sensitivities into account. Having one Commissioner per
member state is, at least in theory, the best guarantee that this actually
happens.”28 Greater consideration of national interests by the Commission
was also demanded by member states themselves, which resulted, inter
alia, in the incorporation of the comitology procedure regarding the single
market legislation. The possibility of non-compliance with the
Commission’s decisions regarding its executive function, shared with the
Council, and the legal one (as a guardian of the legal framework), is also
highly probable under such system. Although it is true that in the
executive and legal sphere the representativeness of all states is not as
necessary as in the legislative sphere, it would nevertheless invigorate its
legitimacy. Namely, the Commission has four quite distinct kinds of
powers. Apart from its basic role as the independent and sole policies and
legislation proposing institution it also performs tasks that cannot be
carried by the Council or the Parliament, i.e. powers to negotiate
international agreements on the basis of the mandate of the Council; to
take decisions on the compatibility with Community law, and after all to
bring Member States before the Court of Justice if they do not fulfil their
obligations under the Treaties. For these reasons the Commission must
stay equally independent of all the Member States, and must be fully
representative of all of them. Only that way it can fulfil its central roles of
preparing measures in the interests of the whole Union, of safeguarding
the acquis communautaire and of representing the Community/Union.
These are much more important than its “executive” role in the narrow
sense.
Regardless of the fact that the strong position of small states is to
preserve their own Commissioner is watered by the present proposal of
the Convention, acceptance of this part of the Constitutional Treaty could
have negative effects on the process of integration as such. On the
contrary it may contribute to the widening of the democratic deficit.
                                                          
28 Max Kohnstamm and Guillaume Durand, “Common Nonsense – Defusing the Escalating ‘Big versus Small’
Row”, European Policy Centre  – The Europe We Need, Brussels, May 2003, http://www.theepc.net/europe/
strand_one_detail.asp?STR_ID=1&REFID=1163&TWSEC=Commentary&TWDOSS.
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The election of the Commission President – decreasing the democratic gap
but weakening the Commission?
As was already explained previously, the Commission is often referred to
as being the best friend of the smaller member states, at least in theory.
This is based on the assumption that the Commission as a guardian of the
Community interest would not take undue respect to interests others than
the ones of the Union as a whole. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
examine whether this is really the case, therefore this paper is based on
the assumption that it is in the interest of the smaller member states to
have a stronger role for the Commission. One way of straightening the
Commission’s legitimacy, it is assumed, is by increasing the democratic
legitimacy of the President of the Commission.29
According to the present system the European Council, acting by a
qualified majority, nominates the person it intends to appoint as President
of the Commission (Article 214 TEC). The European Parliament then
approves the nomination by an absolute majority (Article 198 TEC). If no
majority is received the procedure has to be repeated. The other Members
of the Commission are nominated by the Council and then the
Commission, as a body, is subject to a vote of approval by the European
Parliament. After approval the Council appoints the President and the
other Members of the Commission.
In the proposal of the Convention the President of the Commission shall
be elected by the European Parliament.30 According to draft Article I-26 of
the proposal, the European Council, deciding by qualified majority, puts
forward its candidate for the Presidency of the Commission. When
nominating a candidate the European Council shall take into account the
elections to the European Parliament. The nominated candidate shall then
be elected by the Parliament by a majority of its members. If the majority
support of the Parliament is not received the European Council shall within
one month put forward a new candidate. Furthermore, the President and
the nominated Commissioners, as a body, shall be approved by the
European Parliament. Thus, two new elements are added in the proposal
compared to the present system.
First, according to the proposal the European Parliament will elect the
Commission President. Compared to the present system the proposal
does, in fact, not change the position of the European Parliament since
only one candidate is put forward the Parliament. Thus no options, other
                                                          
29 Wouter Coussens and Ben Crum, Towards, Effective and Accountable Leadership of the Union, Options and
Guidelines for Reform, EPIN Working Papers, No. 3, Royal Institute for International Relations of Belgium
(KIIB-IRRI) and Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, January 2003, p. 8. (available at
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30 Institutions – draft articles for Title IV of Part I of the Constitution, CONV 691/03, Brussels, 23 April 2003,
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than approval and non-approval, are open to the Parliament. An election
usually means that there are several options, at least in democratic multi-
party systems. The Parliament can, of course, not elect the candidate but
this would only mean that another one-option election would be made
within one month. So, instead of approving the nominated person, as is
the case now, the European Parliament will according to the proposal elect
the nominated person. Will this improve the democratic legitimacy of the
President? Since the Parliament will not have any options the proposal
seems to be far from satisfactory in this regard. If the democratic
legitimacy is supposed to be strengthened the Parliament should at least
be given a choice between several candidates, for instance three or five.
On the other hand, symbolically the proposal changes the institutional
balance, by explicitly stating that the European Parliament, and not the
Council, elects the President of the Commission.31
Second, the proposal states that the European Council, when nominating
the candidate, shall take into account the elections to the European
Parliament. It is difficult to foresee what this will actually mean since no
qualification is made regarding this in the proposal. It seems as if the
European Council can, in fact, disregard the election to the European
Parliament. Therefore the proposal does not imply any significant change
of the nomination procedure or the legitimacy of the Commission
President.
It should also be noted that the Commission would still be responsible to
the Parliament according to the Convention proposal (Article I-26 para 3),
which stipulates that the Parliament may pass a censure motion on the
Commission. If such a motion is passed, the members of the Commission
must all resign (see also Article 201 TEC).
Is the proposal then in line with the interest of the smaller states? Some
of the states do want the Parliament to elect the Commission President,
for example Austria, Greece, France, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic and the Netherlands. Others want to keep status quo like
Sweden, Finland, Portugal, UK, Estonia and Spain. Ireland and Denmark
support the model of an electoral college to elect the President of the
Commission. Slovakia supports the idea of a super-majority and Malta
supports the idea of a congress of national parliamentarians to elect the
President.32 Looking at the proposed amendments submitted by some of
the representatives of the smaller states to the Convention the positions
are in some cases different.33 For example, the Swedish representative
                                                          
31 See John Palmer, “SOS democracy – Commission Presidents should be elected, not appointed”, European
Policy Centre – The Europe We Need - Commentary, Brussels, 30 April 2003, http://www.theepc.net/europe/
strand_one_detail. asp?STR_ID=1&REFID=1155&TWSEC=Commentary&TWDOSS.
32 National debates and positions on the Future of Europe compiled by EPIN, available at http://www.epin.org/
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has suggested that the national parliaments and the European Parliament
should elect the candidate. The Danish representatives have suggested
that an Electoral College should elect the President out of a list of at least
three candidates. Also the Irish representative is proposing that the
national parliaments should be involved in the election process. The
Cyprus and Portuguese representatives and also some of the Finnish
representatives are proposing a list of at least three candidates to be put
forward the European Parliament. The Greek representatives are
proposing that the political groups of the European Parliament should put
forward the candidates. The Slovak representatives are supporting the
proposal but are suggesting that a three fifth majority of the votes in the
Parliament would be required. As we can see, the member states are split
regarding this issue. The dividing line, though, is not between small and
large member states; instead it seems as if the division goes between
traditionally so-called federalist states and states favouring inter-
governmental co-operation.
The election of the president by majority in the European parliament has
some drawbacks.34 It is sometimes alleged that the election of the
Commission President will lead to a greater politicisation of the
Commission. This could be a problem, firstly because the Commission
would not be able to exercise some of its strongly apolitical tasks of a
purely administrative body e.g. in competition policy, secondly because it
would depend more on the political composition of the European
Parliament than nowadays and hence can be more vulnerable to the
possible motion of censure. The fears are, however, quite vain. Firstly, the
real politicisation would only come about if the political fractions in the
European Parliament nominate their candidates. But this does not seem to
be a very likely option as nobody is advocating this strongly. Secondly, it
must be borne in mind that any system basically assumes the Commission
President to be elected in some concert between the European Council and
the European Parliament and the composition of the Council does not
necessarily have to correspond to that of the European Parliament.
Another problem with the proposed system is a low turnout in European
elections, which cannot at the moment provide much more legitimacy for
electing the Commission President. On the other hand, it might be the
election of the Commission President that will increase the citizens´
interest in the role of the European Parliament.35 Supposing that the
electorate will see the election of the Commission President as a natural
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outcome of the European Parliament elections, they will finally see it as
fulfilling one of the main roles that any Parliament actually has – that of
giving the mandate to the “government”. The inter-governmentalists are
likely to fear this step, as this would shift the system towards what can
once become a classical parliament-government relationship. This would
further have to be accompanied by some measures that will make this
procedure more visible, for instance, bringing the investiture of the new
Commission upon the European Parliament elections.
Another option proposed by some states is to elect the Commission
President by national parliaments, or by an electoral College consisting of
national and European parliamentarians. The system could be based on
the population criteria, as reflected in the number of seats in the European
Parliament, which would determine the share of the vote given to each
national MP. In order to ensure a fair representation, over-representation
of smaller member states should be allowed. Such system would at the
same time indirectly enhance the role of national parliaments. But if this is
the case, it would very much weaken the role of the European Parliament.
It would also create a slightly awkward situation when the Commission
President or Commission as a whole would be elected by a body different
to the one who can censure it.36 It should also be kept in mind that the
legitimacy of the President of the Commission depends on other factors as
well, such as the possibility for her or him to appoint the other Members
of the Commission.
Finally, direct election of the Commission President could be an
alternative. But this does not seem to be very feasible for the smaller
states since the results would be determined by more populous, thus
larger, states (which, needless to say, is a mere consequence of the
democratic principle; one man or woman – one vote). Given the non-
existence of European demos, it would be difficult to persuade the French
or Brits to vote for a Finnish or Irish candidate. Different again would be
the case when pan-European political parties come up with their
candidates – this might help to overcome the national prism of the
candidates. But this situation is still far from reality. The real challenge is
to build an institutional balance reflecting both the democratic principles
and the fact that the Union is a union of states. An interesting proposal
made by the Convention in this regard is that in 2009 every Member State
will have one vote in the Council, according to draft Article I-24.
Coming back to the current proposal. Supposing that it is in the interest of
small Member States to have a strong Commission and that therefore the
democratic legitimacy of the Commission needs to be strengthened. One
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way of strengthening the democratic legitimacy could be to give the
European Parliament the power to elect the President of the Commission
as is suggested by the Convention. The proposal, though, does in fact not
change the position of the European Parliament in this regard other than
symbolically. The Parliament should, at least, be presented by several
options or a list of candidates if the goal is to give the Parliament the
power to elect the Commission President.
Even if it is not more than of a symbolic value to the Parliament, the
current proposal might still be supported by a number of Member States,
small as well as large, since the dividing line between the Member States
regarding this issue seems to go between so called federalists and inter-
governmentalists.  The more federalist oriented states in favour of a
strong Commission could be supporting the proposal from the Convention
for two contradictory reasons - because the proposal states that the
Parliament in theory at least elects the President of the Commission or
because the proposal in fact does not strengthen the parliamentary
control of the Commission and thus leaves the Commission independent.
The intergovernmental oriented states could also support the proposal
because it would still leave the factual power of the election of the
Commission President to the Council, when nominating the President
candidate.
Conclusions
From what has been said, it seems that the smaller member states should
not be very happy with the current proposal tabled by the Convention in
respect to the three major issues discussed – the permanent President of
the European Council, the size and composition of the Commission and
the election of the Commission President. The permanent Council chair as
suggested in the Presidium proposal will not be much of an asset to the
small members nor to the EU as a whole. Also there are strong arguments
in favour of equal representation of member states in the Commission
rather than creating a two-tier system.  With respect to the election of the
Commission President, the stance of the small states is more divergent
and seems to go more along pro-federalist versus inter-governmentalist
patterns. Most small countries though favour enhancing the democratic
legitimacy of the Commission but the current proposal is not likely to
enhance the democratic legitimacy of the President.
If the smaller member states want to achieve any sensible shift forward in
the power sharing mechanisms of the future Union of 25+, they should
advocate more ambitious and perhaps even more provocative proposals
than they have done so far. The Convention has tabled its proposal to the
Thessaloniki European Council and its chairman, Valéry Giscard d´Estaing
has suggested that no substantial questions should be reopen at the IGC.
This idea is well supported by some member states, notably France and
20
Germany, who worked hard to reach a compromise on institutional
questions.  The only chance for the smaller states is to prepare well for
the upcoming IGC. Given the current distribution of power, they should
perhaps co-ordinate their positions as most of the points discussed are not
issues where their interests would diverge dramatically. Despite the fact
that some attempts to co-ordinate the positions of “like-minded countries”
constantly appear (e.g. the Prague meeting at the beginning of
September), the small countries do not want this group to appear as an
institutionalised or co-ordinated body. If however no co-ordinated position
of the small countries appears, the whole battle is likely to end up at the
horse trading at the upcoming IGC. If the small countries do not succeed,
they risk that the current “tyranny of the Small” will become “directoire”
of the Big.
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